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Judicial Review at 30 
Chris McCorkindale1, Aileen McHarg,2 Tom Mullen3 
There is nothing quite like an anniversary to provoke reflection: about where we have come from, 
about where we find ourselves; and, inevitably, about where next we might be headed. Taking as 
their cue the thirtieth anniversary of the introduction of rule 260B to the Rules of Court,4 the essays 
gathered in this special edition each, in their own way, attempt to address these questions as they 
relate to the practice and the evolution of judicial review in Scotland.5 
Of course, in one sense, it seems somewhat misleading to celebrate now (just) thirty years of judicial 
review. After all, the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of Session  W ƚŚĂƚ ďǇ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƚ  “ŬĞĞƉ ?Ɛ ?
inferior judicatories and administrative bodies right, in the sense of compelling them to keep within 
the limits of their statutory ƉŽǁĞƌƐ ?6 - has a history as long as that of the court itself.7 However, and 
as Lord Reed explains in the opening contribution to this edition,8 the procedure that we now 
recognise as judicial review can be traced to the introduction of rule 260B, which  W following (though 
not in their entirety)9 the recommendations of the Dunpark Report10 - ƐŽƵŐŚƚƚŽĐƌĞĂƚĞ “ĂƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇ
rapid and accessible means ĨŽƌĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐƚŚĞůĞŐĂůŝƚǇŽĨĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ? ?11 where once recourse to that 
jurisdiction was infrequent and unduly cumbersome. Indeed, early research into the success of those 
reforms painted a mostly positive picture of a steadily increasing judicial review case load that was 
nevertheless expeditious and (reasonably) user-friendly.12 On their thirtieth anniversary, however, 
we believe that the time has come to revisit some key research questions around the operation of 
these reforms as well as to ask some anew, and this for (at least) three reasons.   
The first is the dearth of academic research, and indeed of corresponding teaching materials, 
dedicated to the study of judicial review in Scotland that has been produced during the period since 
those studies. As Alan Page notes in his contribution, the most recent comprehensive academic 
research was conducted almost two decades ago,13 whilst the most recent comprehensive 
practitioner and student textbooks were also published before the turn of the twenty-first century.14 
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5 Each of the contributions to this collection were first presented at a conference  W 30 Years of Judicial Review -  
held jointly by Strathclyde and Glasgow University Law Schools on 26th January 2015, with the generous 
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7 ^ĞĞ>ŽƌĚ,ŽƉĞ ?ƐůĞŶŐƚŚǇŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŝŶWest v Secretary of State for Scotland 1992 SC 385 at 396-402. 
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9 For example, the recommendation that a panel of nominated judges be appointed by the Lord President to 
hear and decide judicial review petitions was not taken up. See Tom Mullen, Kathy Pick and Tony Prosser, 
Judicial Review in Scotland (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1996), p.10.    
10 Report to the Rt Hon Lord Emslie, Lord President of the Court of Session, by the Working Party on Procedure 
for Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1984). 
11 Mullen at al (fn 6), p.135. 
12 Alan WĂŐĞ ? ‘:ƵĚŝĐŝĂůZĞǀŝĞǁŝŶƚŚĞŽƵƌƚŽĨ^ĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ŝŶSocio-Legal Research in the Scottish Courts, Volume 2 
(Scottish Office, Central Research Unit, 1987); Mullen et al (fn 6). 
13 Mullen et al (fn 6). ADD CROSS REF TO A PAGE CONTRIBUTION 
14 ^ĞĞŝĚĂŶK ?EĞŝůů ?Judicial Review in Scotland : a practitioner's guide (London: Butterworths, 1999) and Scott 
Blair, Scots Administrative Law: Cases and Materials (Edinburgh: W Green/Sweet & Maxwell, 1999). Compare 
This omission in the literature is all the more problematic given the link made by Lord Reed between 
(until recently) the paucity of administrative law teaching in Scottish law schools and (certainly by 
way of comparison to its expansion across the border during the 1970s) the stunted development of 
judicial review here in Scotland.15 Certainly, judicial review is now a staple part of legal education in 
all Scottish law schools. Nevertheless, if we are to take seriously its distinctiveness (on which more 
below) the lack of research and teaching materials which pay adequate (and critical) attention to the 
nuances and idiosyncrasies of Scots administrative law must be addressed. The thirtieth anniversary 
therefore affords us a convenient opportunity to reflect upon the experience of the intervening 
period, to (re)assess the success (or otherwise) of the existing procedures, and in so doing to provide 
a much needed resource that will be of broad interest to fellow academics and students, as well as 
to practitioners in the field.  
Secondly, the evolution of the supervisory jurisdiction has been accelerated during the past thirty 
years, first by membership of the European Union and by the constitutional reforms brought about 
by the New Labour government, and laterally by way of reforms made to that jurisdiction itself by an 
active Supreme Court. So, on the one hand, the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the 
Scotland Act 1998 has been to confer upon the Court of Session (and, in relation to devolution 
issues, the Supreme Court) some of the characteristics of a constitutional court.16 Meanwhile, and as 
Denis Edwards explains in his contribution, the fundamental effects on UK public law that flow from 
membership of the European Union have been felt on judicial review procedures (the making of 
preliminary references to the CJEU, for example), substantive grounds (most notably, proportionality 
review) and remedies (establishing a right to claim compensation from public authorities for damage 
caused as a result of their violation of rights or obligations conferred by EU law).17 More than the 
authority to compel inferior bodies to remain within the limits of their statutory powers, the Court is 
now possessed of the authority to declare primary legislation made by the UK Parliament to be 
incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights,18 to strike down as unlawful primary 
legislation made by the Scottish Parliament that is deemed to fall outwith its legislative 
competence,19 and to disapply primary legislation of the UK Parliament that brings UK law into 
conflict with EU law.20 On the other hand, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has been equally 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the paucity of Scottish materials with the vast array of up to date student texts which deal with judicial review 
primarily in England & Wales but which, for the most part, pay lip service to the nuances of Scots law.  
15 ADD CROSS REF TO L REED CONTRIBUTION 
16 KŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ? ƐĞĞ >ŽƌĚ EĞƵďĞƌŐĞƌ ?Ɛ ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ >ĞŐĂů tĂůĞƐ ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ  ? ? ? ? ?  ‘dŚĞ h< ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů
^ĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ZŽůĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h< ^ƵƉƌĞŵĞ ŽƵƌƚ ? (10 October 2014), available at 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-141010.pdf.  
17 ADD CROSS REF TO D EDWARDS CONTRIBUTION 
18 Human Rights Act 1998, s4. Such a declaration was made by the Court of Session sitting as an election court 
in Smith v Scott 2007 SC 345, relating to the vexed question of prisoner voting. 
19 See the complex and tragic case of Salvesen v Riddell [2012] UKSC 22, in which it was successfully argued 
that s72(10) of the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003 was incompatible with Article 1 Protocol 1 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and therefore outwith the legislative competence of the Scottish 
Parliament. 
20 [1991] 1 AC 603. More recently, in Benkharbouche and Janah v Embassy of the Republic of Sudan and others 
[2015] EWCA Civ 33, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision by the Employment Appeals Tribunal to disapply 
elements of the State Immunity Act 1978 which conflicted with rights conferred on individuals by the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (ECFR). See also R (on the application of Davis) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWHC 2092 (Admin), where the ECFR was used to disapply 
aspects of the controversial Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA). Given the more direct 
transformative: chipping away at the stubborn distinction between intra vires and ultra vires errors 
of law; liberalising the law of standing so as to allow public interest litigants to petition the court in 
lieu of a private interest capable of enforcement; asserting the Rule of Law enforced by the courts as 
a constitutional fundamental capable of trumping primary legislation;21 as Lord Reed has said, the 
Scots law on judicial review can no longer, as arguably was the case in 1985, ƉƌĞƐƵƉƉŽƐĞƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞ
ŽŶůǇ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ ƐƵƉĞƌǀŝƐŽƌǇ ũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ  ?ŝƐ ? ƚŽ ƌĞĚƌĞƐƐ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ŐƌŝĞǀĂŶĐĞƐ  ?but must 
recognise and perhaps even give priority to] its constitutional function of maintaining the Rule of 
LĂǁ ? ?22  
Thirdly, as well as giving us an opportunity to look back on these developments, this anniversary is 
significant because it also marks a new beginning: thirty years after the introduction of rule 260B the 
civil court system in Scotland is about to undergo radical reforms with, inter alia, important 
procedural implications for judicial review that take effect from 22nd September this year. Whilst, as 
we have seen, early studies into the impact of the new procedure pointed to its success in creating 
ĂŶ ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ŵĞĂŶƐ ŽĨ ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐ ƉƵďůŝĐ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ? >ŽƌĚ 'ŝůů ?ƐReport of the Scottish Civil Courts 
Review (the Gill Review), published in 2009, proposed a number of reforms that sought to improve 
the procedure further still, both for petitioners (placing a less onerous sufficient interest test on a 
statutory footing, and amending the rules of court to cater for the making of protective expenses 
orders) and for respondent public authorities (the introduction of a permission stage and three 
month time limit to raise proceedings). These reforms have not been uncontroversial: both their 
necessity and their capacity to improve the judicial review procedure have been strongly 
contested.23 In his contribution, however, Tony Kelly looks beyond that prior debate to shift our 
focus towards the possible impact of these impending reforms and to lessons that we might learn 
from the application of similar procedures in England and Wales. 
As we seek to take stock of the development of the supervisory jurisdiction over the past thirty 
years, and to look forward to the next thirty years, there are two key questions to ask about judicial 
review in Scotland. The first is how well equipped the Scottish procedure is to carry out its 
constitutional functions. As already noted, the fundamentally important role of judicial review in 
upholding the Rule of Law is more and more emphasised, and here the courts have an increasingly 
directive24 role to play, not merely in ensuring that decision-makers stay within the letter of their 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and immediate remedial consequences of disapplication as opposed to the making of a declaration of 
incompatibility under s4 of the Human Rights Act, one might expect the ECFR to become an increasingly 
significant feature of the UK public law landscape. 
21 However, note the subtly different approaches taken to reach this conclusion by Lords Hope and Reed in 
AXA General Insurance v Lord Advocate [2005] UKSC 56. For Lord Hope the rule of law is a separate and 
distinct source of constitutional authority which might, in extreme circumstances, trump not only Acts of the 
Scottish Parliament but perhaps Acts of (the UK) Parliament too (at [42]-[52]). Whilst Lord Reed agreed that 
Acts of the Scottish Parliament might be struck down where they conflict with the rule of law, for his Lordship 
this result would be achieved by way of statutory interpretation, applying the principle of legality to the 
Scotland Act 1998 (at [135]-[154]).       
22 Walton v Scottish Ministers [2012] UKSC 44 at 90. 
23 ^ĞĞ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?DĐ,ĂƌŐ ? ‘ĐĐĞƐƐƚŽ:ƵĚŝĐŝĂůZĞǀŝĞǁŝŶ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ? ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ? UK Constitutional Law 
Association Blog, available at http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2013/07/30/aileen-mcharg-access-to-judicial-
review-in-scotland/.  
24 dŚĞƚĞƌŵƐ ‘ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ĂƌĞƚĂŬĞŶĨƌŽŵ Aileen DĐ,ĂƌŐ ? ‘ŽƌĚĞƌŝƐƉƵƚĞƐ: the Scope and 
WƵƌƉŽƐĞƐŽĨ:ƵĚŝĐŝĂůZĞǀŝĞǁ ? ?ŝŶileen McHarg and Tom Mullen (eds), Public Law in Scotland (Edinburgh: 
Avizandum, 2006), pp. 234  W 236. 
legal mandates, but also in articulating the values that they understand to be encompassed within 
the Rule of Law. This in turn requires judges conducting judicial review to negotiate the tensions 
contained within an increasingly complex constitutional landscape: between the Rule of Law and 
Parliamentary Sovereignty, as well as both horizontal and vertical Separations of Powers. It is, 
however, important not to lose sight of the fact that judicial review continues to perform its 
traditional, protective function, that is, to act as a remedy of last resort for those with grievances 
against governmental bodies  W and in Scotland also against a range of other decision-makers upon 
whom a jurisdiction has been conferred.25 
In evaluating the effectiveness of judicial review, a number of issues need to be addressed. One 
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ƚŚŝŶŐ ƚŽŬŶŽǁ ŝƐŚŽǁ ũƵĚŝĐŝĂů ƌĞǀŝĞǁ ŝƐĂĐƚƵĂůůǇƵƐĞĚ ŝŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?WĂŐĞ ?Ɛarticle confirms 
that use of the jurisdiction in Scotland continues to be low, certainly as compared with England and 
Wales, and that moreover petitions are concentrated in a few areas, particularly immigration and 
prisons. As he rightly notes, statistics by themselves do not allow us to conclude whether judicial 
review is over- or under-used. Nevertheless, they provide a useful benchmark against which to 
assess the implications of recent or pending procedural reforms for the judicial review caseload. 
<ĞůůǇ ?Ɛ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁ ƚŝŵe limit and permission requirement suggests that, paradoxically, 
litigation is likely to increase, at least in the short term, as practitioners try to work out what 
approach the courts will take to the grant of permission and application of time limits, but also as 
the stakes regarding choice of procedure (judicial review or ordinary action) become higher. Tom 
DƵůůĞŶ ?Ɛ ĞƐƐĂǇ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ŽĨ ƌĞĨŽƌŵƐ ƚŽ ƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ? ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĐŽƐƚƐ ƌƵůĞƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ
ability of pressure groups and others to use judicial review to advance public interest objectives.26 
The opening up of judicial review in this way is essential to the successful performance of its Rule of 
Law function, and many would argue that reform was long overdue. However, Mullen argues that 
barriers to public interest litigation remain, and that the Court of Session still appears to be more 
wedded to a grievance-remedial conception of the functions of judicial review.27 Finally, it is also 
imperative to understand how judicial review fits into the wider landscape of administrative justice 
in Scotland. As Brian Thompson reminds us in his contribution,28 judicial review is only one of a range 
of mechanisms that citizens may use to resolve their disputes with public bodies, and it has 
important interactions with those other mechanisms, both as the remedy of last resort, when others 
are not available or suitable, and as the apex dispute-mechanism, overseeing tribunals, ombudsmen 
and complaints-handlers as well as primary decision-makers. We therefore need to understand what 
are the distinctive and valuable functions that judicial review performs that other mechanisms 
ĐĂŶŶŽƚ ?ĂŶĚŚŽǁǁĞůůƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ‘ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? Wif it can be called that  W works as a whole.   
The second question that arises is what, if anything, is distinct about the way in which judicial review 
in Scotland performs its constitutional functions. It is notable that, while the introduction of Rule 
260B was inspired by similar reforms in England, the two procedures were not identical. In West, 
decided seven years later, the Inner House was also at pains to ensure that Scots law did not follow 
the approach of English law to the determination of the scope of judicial review, setting out instead 
a distinctive  W some might say idiosyncratic  W approach, which eschewed a public law/private law 
                                                          
25 See West, above n?. 
26 Cross-reference to Mullen. 
27 See also Chris McCorkindale and Paul ^ĐŽƚƚ ? ‘WƵďůŝĐ/ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ:ƵĚŝĐŝĂůZĞǀŝĞǁŝŶƌŽƐƐ-ŽƌĚĞƌWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? 
(2015) 26(2) <ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ>Ăǁ:ŽƵƌŶĂů(forthcoming, September).  ??? 
28 Cross-reference to Thompson. 
distinction. Other differences could also be found, particularly in relation to remedies, but also on 
matters of substantive law. More fundamentally, Scottish judges and textbook writers have 
frequently insisted upon the distinctive nature and different historical roots of judicial review in 
Scotland as compared with England.29 As recently as 2011, in Eba v Advocate General for Scotland,30 
the Supreme Court held that those differences were sufficiently great as to require the question as 
to the amenability of the Upper Tribunal to judicial review in both jurisdictions to be decided 
separately, even though the decision finally adopted was the same in both cases.31 
In reality, however, the differences between Scots and English judicial review have been 
substantially eroded. Recent procedural and substantive reforms, as well as the processes of 
constitutionalisation and Europeanisation, have served to bring judicial review in Scotland much 
closer to its English counterpart. Indeed, it is important to acknowledge that most of the 
development, both procedural and substantive, of judicial review over the past thirty years has been 
led by the English courts, with Scotland belatedly catching up.   
This does not, of course, mean that judicial review is now identical north and south of the border. 
For instance, as Chris Himsworth argues in his article, despite the abolition of the intra vires/ultra 
vires errors distinction in Eba, there may be a continuing (albeit different) divergence in the 
approach to review for error of law in Scotland and England.32 New differences are also opening up 
in relation to procedure as, rather ironically, judicial review in England is becoming less accessible to 
claimants due to the UK Government ?Ɛ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐto rein in what it sees as excessive use of the 
remedy, and in particular its claimed abuse by campaign groups for political purposes.33 The scope of 
review also remains an area of substantial divergence, although here too the difference is less than it 
was, as Scots judges have been forced to concede that judicial review is, at least sometimes, a public 
law remedy.34 
Whether these differences are enough to support the claim that judicial review in Scotland and 
England are fundamentally different, or indeed whether there should be fundamental differences, 
are questions which cannot be fully explored here.35 Nevertheless, as we look forward from this 
thirty year anniversary, we hope that the contributions to this special issue will stimulate further 
debate about, and further research into, both the theory and practice of judicial review in Scotland. 
                                                          
29 See, e.g., Lord Clyde and Denis J. Edwards, Judicial Review (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2000), ch. 2. 
30 [2011] UKSC 29. 
31 The equivalent English case is R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28. 
32 Cross-reference to Himsworth. 
33 See Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, Pt 4; Ministry of Justice, Reform of Judicial Review: Proposals for 
the Provision and Use of Financial Information, Cm 9117, July 2015. 
34 Davidson v Scottish Ministers (No 1) [2005] UKHL 76.  However, what precisely are the differences between 
public law and private law judicial review remains elusive.  The distinction as to standing introduced in AXA, 
where Lord Hope held that the old title and interest test should be retained for private law cases, has proved 
to be short lived.  The sufficient interest test now contained in the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014, s. 89, 
makes no distinction between public law and private law cases. 
35 But see McHarg, above n?, pp. 238  W 240, and Aileen DĐ,ĂƌŐ ? ‘WƵďůŝĐ>Ăǁ ?WƌŝǀĂƚĞ>Ăǁ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ
ŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŽĨ^ĐŽƚƐ:ƵĚŝĐŝĂůZĞǀŝĞǁ ? (20 January 2012) UK Constitutional Law Association Blog, available at: 
http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/01/20/aileen-mcharg-public-law-private-law-and-the-distinctiveness-of-
scots-judicial-review/.  
